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RECIDIVIST

STATUTES-APPLICATION

OVERBREADTH DOCTRINES TO REPEAT

OF

PROPORTIONALITY

AND

OFFENDERS-Wanstreet v.

Bordenkircher,276 S.E.. 2d 205 (W. Va. 1981).
In 1967 George Wanstreet was convicted of forging a forty-three dollar
check and received a life sentence under West Virginia's recidivist statute.' This statute, one of the two harshest in the nation, 2 requires life
imprisonment for persons convicted of three felonies. 3 Wanstreet had
been convicted in 1951 for forging an eighteen dollar check and in 1955
for arson of a barn valued at $490. He had been in prison more than ten
years for the 1967 conviction when the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held, in Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher,4 that his sentence violated
the proportionality clause 5 of the West Virginia Constitution.
The facts and issues in Wanstreet paralleled those faced by the United
States Supreme Court a year earlier. In Rummel v. Estelle,6 the Court
found that a life sentence imposed under a habitual criminal statute did
not violate the eighth amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual
punishment. ' 7 The Rummel Court refused to apply the proportionality

1. W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977). The statute requires a five-year sentence enhancement on a
second felony conviction and life imprisonment on the third felony conviction. It states in relevant
part: "When it is determined . . . that such person shall have been twice before convicted in the
United States of a crime punishable by confinement in a penitentiary, the person shall be sentenced to
be confined in the penitentiary for life." Id. See generally Brown, West Virginia HabitualCriminal
Law, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 30 (1956) (discussing and critiquing the enforcement of West Virginia's
recidivist statute). The terms "recidivist" and "habitual criminal" are interchangeable; this Note
generally uses the terminology of the statute being discussed.
2. Texas is the other state that imposes life sentences on three-time felons. TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN., 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974); see Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 296 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). Washington also had a habitual criminal law requiring a life sentence after three felony
convictions when Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205 (W. Va. 1981), was decided. See
WASH. REv. CoDE § 9.92.090 (1981). The statute was repealed in 1981. Sentencing Reform Act of
1981, ch. 137, § 31, 1981 Wash. Laws 519, 532 (effective 1984). For descriptions of other states'
recidivist laws see Rummel, 445 U.S. at 296-99; L. SLEFFeL, THE LAW AND THE DANGEROUS CRIMINAL 1-40 (1977).
3. Application of the recidivist statute is at the prosecutor's discretion. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448 (1962); Martin v. Leverette, 244 S.E.2d 39, 42-43 (W. Va. 1978).
4. 276S.E.2d205,214(W.Va. 1981).
5. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted. Penalties shall be proportioned to the character and degree of the offence." W.
VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 5.
6. 445 U.S. 263 (1980); cf. McMahan v. State, 269 Ind. 566, 382 N.E.2d 154 (1978) (holding
life sentence for habitual criminal guilty of three felonies constitutional); State v. Fain, 94-Wn. 2d
387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980) (Washington Supreme Court faced with facts similar to Wanstreet and
Rummel holding sentence disproportionate under Washington Constitution).
7. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsr. amend VIII.
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doctrine, which mandates that the sentence imposed be proportional to
the crime, to Rummel's life sentence. Rather, it suggested that the applicability of this doctrine was limited to capital sentences. 8 The opposing
results of Rummel and Wanstreet indicate a split between federal and state
courts on the reach of the proportionality doctrine, a split based on conflicting views of the doctrine's role as a constitutional principle.
This Note begins by reviewing the proportionality doctrine and its application by the courts. It describes the Wanstreet court's reasoning and
analyzes the proportionality test used by the court. The Note concludes
that West Virginia's recidivist statute should be declared unconstitutional
under the state's proportionality clause because it fails to differentiate between crimes of differing moral culpability.
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Theoty: Retribution

The doctrine of proportionality was part of English common law. 9 As
early as 1215, the Magna Carta contained a clause insuring that "[a] free
man shall not be [fined] for a trivial offence, except in accordance with
the degree of the offence; and for a serious offence he shall be [fined]
according to its gravity."1 0 Modernly, the proportionality doctrine concerns "the relationship between the nature and number of offenses committed and the severity of the punishment inflicted upon the offender." '
Under the doctrine, punishment is justified on the grounds that the offense
deserves punishment and not on the grounds that the punishment serves a
utilitarian goal. Thus, the severity of the punishment depends on the
moral gravity of the act. 12
The Supreme Court first recognized proportionality as a constitutional
principle in Weems v. United States.13 Although the United States Consti8.

See445 U.S. at 272.

9. See SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 236 (R. Perry rev. ed. 1978); Granucci. "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 844-52 (1969): Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the
Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783, 787-89 (1975):
see also Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 425-32 (2d Cir. 1978) (Oakes. J., dissenting) (surveying
history of eighth amendment and proportionality), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979).
10. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288-89 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting J. HOLT. MAGNA CARTA 323
(1965)).
I1. Rummel. 445 U.S. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
12. Id.; Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3. 4-5 (1955); see notes 17-21 and

accompanying text infra.
13. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Weems was convicted of falsifying Philippine government records. He
apparently had no intent to defraud and no loss occurred to the Philippine government. Id. at 363.
The statute in question required:
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tution does not explicitly incorporate the proportionality doctrine, the
Weems Court found it implicit in the eighth amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" clause. 14 In addition, many states have adopted proportionality as a state constitutional principle either by following the
Weems approach 15 or by explicitly including the proportionality principle
in their constitutions as West Virginia has done. 16
The proportionality doctrine has its roots in the retributive, or "justdeserts," theory of punishment. 17 Under the retributive theory only the
moral culpability of the defendant, not public safety or law enforcement
necessity, justifies punishing an individual. Moral culpability is the measure of the criminal's personal guilt and derives from the "moral egre[a] minimum term of imprisonment [of] twelve years, . . . [which] must be imposed for "perverting the truth" in a single item of a public record, though there be no one injured, though
there be no fraud or purpose of it, no gain or desire of it. Twenty years is the maximum imprisonment, and that only can be imposed for the perversion of truth in every item of an officer's
account ....
Id. at 365. Weems was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment with hard and "painful" labor in chains
plus perpetual restriction of liberty after release. Id. Weems challenged the constitutionality of his
sentence under the Philippine bill of rights. Because the Philippine "cruel and unusual punishment"
clause was taken from the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court held it had the
same meaning. Id. at 367. The Court did not rest its ruling on the cruelty of the painful labor and
other accessories to the punishment, however, but relied on proportionality to overturn the sentence.
See id. at 380-82; see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (finding
Weems adopted proportionality test); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (same); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (same); Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (dictum) (same).
The eighth amendment was incorporated into the 14th and thus made applicable to the states in
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
14. The Weems Court based its opinion on proportionality. See 217 U.S. at 365-68. The line of
reasoning used by the Court to incorporate proportionality into the eighth amendment is less clear.
Presumably, it found proportionality required by the Constitution as it was part of "fundamental
law." See id. at 367.
15. See, e.g., In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 424, 503 P.2d 921, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226
(1972); State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788, 792-94 (1952); Workman v. Commonwealth,
429 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Ky. 1968); State v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980).
16. W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5, reprintedin part in note 5 supra;see also IND. CONST. art I, §
16; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 9; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 39.
17.

See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 230-37 (1968); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS

OF THE CRIMINAL SANCrION 14 (1968); Dressier, Substantive Criminal Law Through the Looking
Glass of Rummel v. Estelle: Proportionalityand Justice as Endangered Doctrines, 34 Sw. L.J.
1063, 1079-80 (1981); Note, Disproportionalityin Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1119, 1121 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Disproportionalityin Sentences].
Utilitarian philosophers have espoused proportionality as well. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 178-203 (2d ed. Oxford 1876) (1st ed. n.p.

1789). Under the utilitarian theory, proportionality is established by looking to the amount of deterrence required for different crimes: more for the greater ones, and less for the smaller ones. See, e.g.,
H. PACKER, supra, at 140. The utilitarian view also looks at incapacitation and rehabilitation purposes and therefore will not always reach proportionate results. See id. at 139-40; Dressier, supra, at
1080.

575

Washington Law Review

Vol. 57:573, 1982

giousness" of the crime. 18 This egregiousness arises from two aspects of
the crime: the harmfulness of the act and the personal culpability of the
defendant in committing the act. 19 In the case of a recidivist, the personal
culpability results in great part from the defendant's having ignored the
laws of society for a third time. Because the retributive theory demands
that moral culpability derive only from a person's acts, 20 deterrence of
future acts is not a legitimate justification for individual punishment under
21
the theory.
The retributive theory has been incorporated into federal constitutional
law in some areas. For example, in Robinson v. California,22 the United
States Supreme Court held that the defendant's status as a drug addict
lacked sufficient culpability to justify punishment; therefore punishment
for that status was unconstitutional. 23 Nevertheless, the reach of the retribution doctrine as applied to sentence length in the form of "proportion24
ality" has been limited.
B.

The TraditionalProportionalityTest

Application of the proportionality doctrine should not be based on a
judge's personal beliefs about the fitness of a punishment to a crime. 25 To
18.
19.

E.g., H. PACKER, supra note 17, at 11; Dressler, supra note 17, at 1080.
A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 69, 79-83 (1976); Dressier, supra note 17. at 1080.
A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 19, at 51; Dressier, supra note 17, at 1079; see also Robinson v.

20.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (punishing for a status, as opposed to an act, is unconstitutional):
State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine 233 S.E.2d 318, 330 (W. Va. 1977) (same).
21. H. PACKER, supra note 17, at 11; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 19, at 69: Dressier. supra note
17, at 1075: see also MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT art. 3 prefatory note, at 93 (1979)

("Within the limitations of the deserved punishment, deterrence of others is an appropriate goal to
pursue."): N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 59-60 (1974) ("prediction of future crimi-

nality is an unjust basis for determining that the convicted criminal should be imprisoned").
22. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
23. The Court, later discussing Robinson, said:
The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is
that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has committed some act, has engaged
in some behavior, which society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical common
law terms, has committed some actus reus.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968). But see Enmund v. Florida. --- S. Ct. -.-. -- (1982)
(suggesting that the statute in Robinson was unconstitutional because there was no mens rea requirement). See also Enmund v. Florida, --- S. Ct. --- (1982) (using proportionality to strike down capital
sentence for non-killer in felony murder case); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (using proportionality doctrine to strike down capital sentences for rape).
24. See part ICI infra. See generally Dressier, supra note 17, at 1073-88 (discussing role of
"personhood" concept in federal constitutional decisions).
25. "Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views
of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible
extent. " Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); accord Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980): id. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting); Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 276
S.E.2d 205. 210-11 (W. Va. 1981); cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Frank-
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avoid such personal judgments courts have developed two safeguards.
First, any failure to comport with the proportionality doctrine must be
"gross" before it is unconstitutional. 26 "Gross" refers to the burden of
proof, which requires that the defendant show the punishment differs
"from the appropriate amount [of punishment] sufficiently that the Court
can feel reasonably satisfied that the legislature was wrong in its action
and that the judiciary is correct. "27 In determining "grossness," courts
usually defer to legislative decisions of what constitutes proper punishment. 28 One reason for this deference is that courts often have difficulty
finding evidence of the relative seriousness of different offenses outside
of the existing statutory scheme. For example, widely varying types of
crimes, such as drug crimes, sex crimes, and crimes of violence, are diffi29
cult to rank against one another on a scale of moral culpability.
For the second safeguard, courts have adopted a three-part test based
30
on objective factors to determine whether disproportionality exists.
First, the court examines the nature of the offense to see whether a discrepancy exists between its culpability and the punishment. 31 Among the
factors a court uses to measure culpability are the violent or potentially
violent nature of the crime and the actual or potential property damage
involved. 32 Second, the court compares the sentence imposed with the
furter, J., concurring) ("The judicial judgment in applying the Due Process Clause must move within
the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely
personal judgment.").
26. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 291 (1980) (Powell, J.,dissenting); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
27. Dressier, supranote 17, at 1112. See generallyid. at 1109-12 (analyzing term "gross").
28. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272-75 (1980); Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d
405, 409 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979); In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 9, 553 P.2d
590, 595-96, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430, 435 (1976); Dressier, supranote 17, at 1112 ("[Legislative] deference requires substantial disproportionality before the Court will feel satisfied that the precept was
violated.").
29. Note, Disproportionalityin Sentences, supra note 17, at 1128. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion), allowed a certain amount of
judicial discretion beyond objective factors. See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2398-99
(1981); Dressier, supranote 17, at 1095.
30. See, e.g., In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 8-9, 553 P.2d 590, 595-96, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430, 435
(1976); State v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387, 397-401, 617 P.2d 720, 725-28 (1980); Note, Disproportionality in Sentences, supranote 17, at 1124-36; see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 295 (1980)
(Powell, J.,
dissenting) (advocating three-part test). Courts generally weigh the cumulative impact of
all parts of the test in deciding a sentence's or statute's constitutionality. See, e.g., Downey v. Perini,
518 F.2d 1288, 1292 (6th Cir.), vacated on othergrounds, 423 U.S. 993 (1975); Hart v. Coiner, 483
F.2d 136, 140-43 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); Fain, 94 Wn. 2d at 397-402,
617 P.2d at 726-28.
31. E.g., In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 9-15, 553 P.2d 590, 596-99; 132 Cal. Rptr. 430, 436-39
(1976); State v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387, 397-98, 617 P.2d 720, 726 (1980); Note, Disproportionality
in Sentences, supranote 17, at 1125-28.
32. E.g., Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140-41 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974); State v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387, 398, 617 P.2d 720, 726 (1980); Wanstreet, 276 S.E.2d at 214.
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punishment the defendant would receive for the same crime in other jurisdictions. 33 A sentence considerably more severe than that imposed in a
vast majority of other jurisdictions indicates disproportionality. 34 Last,
the court compares the defendant's sentence with the punishment imposed for other crimes within the same jurisdiction. 35 If a crime of greater
moral culpability carries a lesser punishment, disproportionality is indicated. Some courts also use a fourth test: they examine the legislative, or
penal, purpose of the statute.36
Although the proportionality test is used primarily to determine the excessiveness of sentences, it also reflects a policy favoring just proportions
between punishments within a single system. This policy of "relative
proportionality" calls for all sentences to be part of a graduated scheme
of punishment so that serious crimes receive serious sentences in relation
to minor crimes, which should receive minor sentences. 37 Relative proportionality is an independent constitutional requirement and violation of
38
this principle alone may make the sentence imposed unconstitutional.

33. E.g.. In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 16, 553 P.2d 590, 600, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430, 440 (1976); State
v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387, 399-400, 617 P.2d 720, 726-27 (1980); Note, Disproportionality in Senfences, supra note 17, at 1132-36.
34. E.g., Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288, 1291 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds. 423
U.S. 993 (1975): In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 9, 553 P.2d 590, 595-96, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430, 435
(1976); State v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387, 400, 617 P.2d 720,726-27 (1980).
35. E.g.. In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d I, 14-15, 553 P.2d 590, 599-600. 132 Cal. Rptr. 430.
439-40 (1976); State v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387, 401,617 P.2d 720. 727-28 (1980): Note. Disproportional'tv in Sentences, supra note 17. at 1131-32.
36. E.g., Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1973). cert. denied. 415 U.S. 983 (1974):
Thacker v. Garrison, 445 F. Supp. 376. 378 (W.D.N.C. 1978); In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1,9-13. 553
P.2d 590, 596-99, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430,436-38 (1976); Note, Disproportionalty in Sentences. supra
note 17. at 1124. The "legislative purpose" test, which may be part of the traditional proportionality
test, is different from the rational basis test. The rational basis test, like the legislative purpose test.
looks at a statute's purposes. Nevertheless, it is a separate test for excessiveness of punishment independent from proportionality. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
West Virginia has adopted legislative purpose as a fourth test. See Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher. 276
S.E.2d 205, 210-11 (W. Va. 1981); Martin v. Leverette, 244 S.E.2d 39.43 (W. Va. 1978).
A problem with this test is that it focuses a court's attention away from the moral culpability and
retribution principles upon which the proportionality principle rests. See Note. Disproportionality in
Sentences. supra note 17, at 1124 n.24: notes 11-22 and accompanying text supra. Determining the
amount of punishment sufficient to meet a legislative purpose is difficult and requires courts to speculate. State v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387, 401 n.7, 617 P.2d 720, 728 n.7 (1980). See also note 87 infra
(discussing necessity test); cf. In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910. 923-24, 519 P.2d 1073. 1081. 112 Cal.
Rptr. 649, 657-58 (1974) (attempting to determine how much punishment is enough to meet rehabilitative goals).
37. See generally Note, Disproportionality in Sentences. supra note 17, at 1131-32 (discussing
relative proportionality).
38. See note 124 and accompanying text infra (discussing "lesser-included offense" cases).
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C. Proportionalityin the Courts
1. FederalCourts
Despite its adoption of the proportionality principle in Weems, the Supreme Court has only used the principle twice since then. 39 It has never
40
applied the principle to overturn a sentence of only imprisonment.
Lower federal courts, however, have found imprisonment sentences
disproportionate. In Hartv. Coiner,4 ' the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit examined a life sentence imposed under West Virginia's recidivist
statute when the defendant's three crimes consisted of writing a check on
insufficient funds for fifty dollars, transporting forged checks worth $140
across a state line, and perjury at his son's murder trial. The court found
the sentence "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offenses." 4 2
Other federal courts have also overturned excessive prison sentences on
"gross disproportionality" grounds.a3
The Supreme Court was again confronted with the issue whether a pri39. See Enmund v. Florida, --- S. Ct. ---(1982) (holding capital punishment grossly disproportionate and excessive where the defendant was convicted of a felony murder for his participation in a
robbery, when he did not himself kill, did not attempt to kill, and was not present at the killings);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding capital punishment grossly
disproportionate to the crime of raping an adult woman).
40. See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916) (five year sentence and $7000 fine for
mail fraud not excessive); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631 (1912) (life sentence under
the West Virginia recidivist statute not cruel and unusual punishment); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S.
126, 136 (1903); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) (54 years in prison for 307 counts of
bootlegging; majority held eighth amendment inapplicable to the states; Field, J., dissenting, claimed
that the 14th amendment incorporated the eighth and that the sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate).
41. 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974). For a discussion of the
Hartcase, see Case Comment, Recidivism-Constitutionalityof the West Virginia Recidivist Statute,
77 W. VA. L. REV. 343 (1975).
42. 483 F.2d at 143. The Hartcourt also found the sentence unconstitutionally excessive because
it was "not necessary to achieve any legitimate legislative purpose." Id. It did not indicate whether
either ground alone would make a sentence unconstitutional. Later decisions by other courts have
found either ground sufficient. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(relevant text reprinted in text accompanying note 87 infra); cases cited in note 43 infra. But see note
53 infra (discussing the Supreme Court's later rejection of the proportionality doctrine for prison
sentences in federal system). Because the two tests have different bases and serve different purposes
it is important to distinguish between them. See notes 83-88 and accompanying text infra.
43. Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated and remanded sub. nom
Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), reaffld by equally divided vote, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981)
(en banc), rev'd per curiam, 102 S. Ct. 703 (1982); Thacker v. Garrison, 445 F. Supp. 376
(W.D.N.C. 1978); Camona v. Ward, 436 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 576 F.2d 405 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979); see also Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.)
(holding based primarily on "disproportionality" ground; court, however, also found no legislative
necessity for the punishment), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 993 (1975); United States v.
McKinney, 427 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding five year sentence for draft evasion disproportionate), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 982 (1971).
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son sentence could be constitutionally excessive in Rummel v. Estelle.44
In Rummel, the Court reviewed a life sentence mandated by the Texas
habitual criminal statute. 45 The Court examined whether the statute con46
tributed to acceptable goals of punishment and concluded that it did.
The Court refused to consider whether Rummel's sentence was grossly
disproportionate to the crime, 47 and based this refusal on principles of
federalism and deference to the legislature. 48 The Court justified its refusal by stating that the inquiry involved "intrusion into the basic line49
drawing process that is pre-eminently the province of the legislature"
and that no objective standards were available by which to measure pro50
portionality.
Both these justifications are questionable. The decision whether a sentence is proportionate involves no line drawing whatsoever. Rather, it involves an inquiry into whether the defendant has met the burden of proving the sentence grossly disproportionate. The Court's role is not to
specify where the line between constitutionality and unconstitutionality
should be, but only to find whether a set of facts meets a legal test. This is
the type of decision at which courts are considered most competent.
The lack-of-standards argument is flawed as well. The Rummel Court
cited numerous examples showing that little differences existed between
Rummel's punishment in Texas and that which he would have received in
other states in support of its conclusion that objective standards were not
available. 51 In fact, the examples show something else: the defendant's
failure to meet the burden of proof. A defendant's failure to prove a lack
of proportionality does not imply that the factors used by the defendant
are not objective. 52 Nevertheless, because the Rummel Court found no
44. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Rummel's third conviction was for obtaining S120 by false pretenses:
he previously had been convicted of fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods and
of forging a check for $28. Although all three of Rummel's crimes were felonies in Texas, the total
dollar amount involved was only $230. Id. at 265-66. Rummel's sentence was for life, but the Court
noted that he could be eligible for parole within 12 years. In considering this factor, the Court downplayed the harshness of the sentence. See id. at 280-81. But see id. at 293-94 (Powell. J.. dissenting) (excluding parole as a consideration in undertaking proportionality analysis).
45. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
46. 445 U.S. at 284.
47. See id. at 285.
48. Id. at 274-75, 282, 284-85. The Court stated: "Given the unique nature of the punishment
considered in . . . the death penalty cases, one could argue without fear of contradiction by any
decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies. . . . the
length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." Id. at 274: see

also Hutto v. Davis. 102 S. Ct. 703, 704 (1982) (affirming Rianmel holding).
49. 445 U.S. at 275.
50. Seeid.at279-85.
51.

See id

52. See generally Dressier. supra note 17. at 1098-1106 (arguing that legislative deference was
uncalled for in Runmel and that proportionality analysis should have been undertaken).
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standards satisfactory for objectively measuring the proportionality of imprisonment sentences, review was precluded. Following this reasoning,
even if a sentence were grossly disproportionate, the Court would not
53
overturn it.
In Hutto v. Davis54 the Court confirmed its decision in Rummel to limit
the application of the proportionality doctrine in federal courts. In a per
curiam opinion, the Hutto Court overturned a court of appeals decision
that had held unconstitutional a forty-year sentence for possessing and
selling nine ounces of marijuana. 55 Contrary to its approach in Rummel,
56
the Court in Hutto refused to review the purposes behind the statute.
The Court found any comparison of the "excessiveness of one prison
term as compared to another... invariably... subjective." 57 Although
the Court still espouses proportionality in death penalty cases, imprisonment sentences for felonies, at least under state laws, are not reviewable

for disproportionality.

58

53. See Dressier, supra note 17, at 1098-99; The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV.
75, 94-95 (1980). When the Rummel Court refused to consider independently the proportionality of
the sentence, it rejected the second half of a test for excessiveness it had formulated in Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion), at least in the context of terms of years. See
generally note 86 and accompanying text infra (discussing Coker). Its refusal to use retribution principles as an eighth amendment standard also shows this rejection. The Court found deterrence and
incapacitation principles sufficient to establish a sentence's constitutionality. Further, the Court justified Rummel's life sentence in his "propensity to commit crimes." This violates principles of moral
culpability because it justifies the length on a sentence based on a prisoner's status as opposed to his
acts and allows punishment for future crimes not yet committed rather than for only past acts. See
notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
For a compelling argument that courts should use proportionality sparingly, if at all, see Mulligan,
Cruel and UnusualPunishment:The ProportionalityRule, 47 FORDHAM L. REV., 639 (1979).
54. 102 S. Ct. 703 (1982).
55. There was also evidence that Davis was a drug dealer and had been convicted on a drug
charge in the past. Nevertheless the statute under which he was convicted, unlike that in Rummel,
was not aimed at recidivists. Hutto therefore considerably expands and strengthens Rummel. For this
reason, Justice Brennan, dissenting, questioned the Court's use of a summary opinion, written without benefit of briefs or argument. See Hutto, 102 S. Ct. at 709-12.
56. Rummel left open the possibility that there could be a rational basis but not a proportionality
test for excessiveness of prison sentences. The Court's holding can be read as limited to recidivist
statutes, for which a clear rational basis (incapacitation and deterrence) exists. See 445 U.S. at
284-85. The Hutto Court's summary affirmance of Davis's sentence indicates that the Court will
refuse to review any felony punishment of imprisonment under any test. Thus, the Court rejected the
first half of the test for excessiveness it had formulated in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) (plurality opinion), in the context of imprisonment sentences as well. See note 86-87 and
accompanying text infra; see also note 53 supra(Rummel rejected second half of Coker test).
57. 102 S. Ct. at 704.
58. See Enmund v. Florida, --- S.Ct. --- (1982) (striking down death penalty for non-killer in
felony murder case on proportionality grounds). Even if proportionality is not required by the eighth
amendment, it may be required by the fifth and 14th amendments because it is a "fundamental right"
required by the due process clause. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) (plurality opinion) ("The question thus is whether. . . a procedure is necessary to any Anglo-American
regime of ordered liberty."); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). See generally G. GUN-
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West Virginia Cases

Prior to Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia had never overturned a sentence of imprisonment on proportionality grounds. Since 1910, it had, however, recognized proportionality as a limit on the power of the legislature to set sentences, even
for terms of years. 59 It had also twice addressed "cruel and unusual punishment" challenges to its recidivist statute. In Martin v. Leverette, 6° the
defendant challenged a five-year enhancement of his sentence for a sec-

ond felony of burglary when the first conviction was for armed robbery.
The court recognized the potential applicability of the proportionality
doctrine to the West Virginia recidivist statute. 6 1 Nevertheless, it found
that both crimes were "serious and involve[d] the threat of violence
against persons, if not actual violence in the case of armed robbery" and
62
dismissed the claim.
In State v. Vance, 63 the defendant received a life sentence as a recidivist after being convicted of his third felony. The court noted that breaking and entering, the third felony, "carrie[d] the potentiality of violence
and danger to life.' 64 As in Martin, the court depended on the potential
for violence to dismiss the claim and never reached the question of

THER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 476-501 (10th ed. 1980); J. ISRAEL & W.

LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 5-18 (3d ed. 1980).
59. See State v. Woodward, 68 W. Va. 66, 69 S.E. 385, 389 (1910), where the court stated:
Surely under our Constitution fines so excessive, imprisonment so long, looking to the offense,
as to shock our feelings of humanity, conscience, justice, and mercy would be branded by [the
proportionality] clause. I suppose that a sentence for years to the penitentiary for assault and
battery attended with no serious results, or long imprisonment in jail for profane swearing,
would fall under that clause.
Other cases before Wanstreet also gave indications that the court, given a compelling factual situation, would apply the proportionality doctrine to sentences. First, the West Virginia court adopted the
Hart v. Coiner proportionality test. See State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318, 330 (W.
Va. 1977). Second, the court had incorporated retribution principles into its state constitution,
thereby showing its acceptance of proportionality principles. In Woodward, the court determined that
punishing a defendant for breaking the no-liquor-on-Sunday law did not violate proportionality. It
held that the legislature had the power to create the crime and therefore was empowered to set punishments as well. It thus found inherent in the proportionality doctrine the retribution principle that there
can be no punishment without a crime. See 69 S.E. at 389-90. In State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine,
the court held that a juvenile who was continually truant-a status offense-could not be confined in
the same juvenile facility that housed juveniles convicted of crimes. It reasoned that "no person
could be punished unless he had done something which is generally recognized as deserving of punishment." 233 S.E.2d at 324.
60. 244S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1978).
61. Id. at43.
62. Id. at 43-44.
63. 262 S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1980).
64. Id. at 432.

)
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whether the proportionality doctrine would prohibit excessive sentences
for nonviolent crimes. 65
Before Rummel, the West Virginia Supreme Court viewed the proportionality clause in the state constitution as coextensive with the federal
eighth amendment right, at least for questions of sentence length. It had
not relied on the state constitution to grant rights to defendants beyond
those granted by the Federal Constitution. 66 After Rummel, in Wanstreet
v. Bordenkircher, the court had to decide whether West Virginia's proportionality doctrine made unconstitutional a life sentence for nonviolent
crimes when federal law would not. The court found the West Virginia
proportionality clause more stringent than the federal doctrine and held
67
Wanstreet's recidivist life sentence excessive.
II.

THE COURT'S REASONING

The court in Wanstreet first noted that both it and the United States
Supreme Court had upheld the West Virginia recidivist statute against
several challenges to its constitutionality, including those based on "cruel
and unusual punishment" grounds. 68 The court further observed that it
had strictly construed the statute in past cases because of the statute's
harshness. 69 With this in mind, the court considered the appropriate standard to determine whether a sentence given under the statute was uncon70
stitutionally excessive.
Although the court recognized that it had applied the traditional federal
proportionality test to its recidivist statute in previous cases, 71 Rummel
65. The court had assumed in earlier cases that excessive sentences for nonviolent crimes could
be struck down, even assuming that punishment for violent crimes, such as robbery or assault, could
be unconstitutional if excessive. See Franklin v. Brown, 73 W. Va. 727, 81 S.E. 405, 406 (1914);
State v. Woodward, 68 W. Va. 66, 69 S.E. 385,389 (1910).
66. See State v. Vance, 262 S.E.2d 423, 430-31 (W. Va. 1980); Martin v. Leverette, 244
S.E.2d 39, 43-44 (W. Va. 1978); cf. State ex rel. K.W. v. Werner, 242 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978)
(relying on both state and federal constitutions to find treatment of juveniles "cruel and unusual").
But see State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318, 329-31 (W. Va. 1977) (relying on state
constitution's proportionality clause to prevent incarceration of "status" juvenile offenders in prisonlike facilities with juveniles guilty of criminal conduct); cf. Harrah v. Leverette, 271 S.E.2d 322 (W.
Va. 1980) (relying on state constitution to hold treatment of prisoners "cruel and ususual").
67. 276 S.E.2d at 214.
68. Id. at 207.
69. Id. at 209.
70. The Wanstreetcourt assumed that a sentence given under a constitutional statute could nevertheless be unconstitutional. See note 123 infra.
71. 276 S.E.2d at 210. The court had previously adopted the test developed in Hart v. Coiner,
483 F.2d 136, 143 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974), discussed in notes 41 & 42
and accompanying text supra. See State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318, 330 (W. Va.
1977); see also State v. Vance, 262 S.E.2d 423, 431 (W. Va. 1980) (citing Hart with approval);
Martin v. Leverette, 244 S.E.2d 39, 43 (W. Va. 1978) (same).
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now precluded the use of any test based on the eighth amendment in noncapital cases. Nevertheless, the West Virginia court found that the state
constitution required a higher constitutional proportionality standard than
the federal standard recognized in Rummel. 72 It thus reaffirmed its adoption of the traditional, pre-Rummel federal test under the state constitution. It noted that the traditional proportionality test contained "objective
standards [which] also ensure that appellate courts will not inject their
73
personal views as to [the] appropriateness of a given sentence."
74
In applying its proportionality test, the court first examined the legislative purpose of the recidivist statute. By finding that this was "increased confinement for the dangerous criminal," 75 it implied the statute
was inapplicable to Wanstreet who had committed only nonviolent
crimes. This finding is questionable. Had the legislature intended the statute to apply only to dangerous criminals it could have written the legislation to accomplish that end. Furthermore, the court had previously found
76
the purpose of the statute to be deterrence.
The court then examined the nature of the offense of recidivism and
77
decided that each underlying felony should be considered separately.
Looking at the current felony first, the court noted that mandatory life
sentences were imposed in West Virginia only for far more serious crimes
78
such as first degree murder, kidnapping with bodily harm, and treason.
79
The court then found that the previous felonies were also nonviolent.
Finally, the court compared Wanstreet's sentence with those he would
have received as a recidivist in other jurisdictions. Only two other states
imposed such a severe sentence. 80 The court concluded that Wanstreet's
life sentence for forging a forty-three dollar check violated the constitutional principle of proportionality because requiring a life sentence regardless of the nature of the underlying crime "would ignore the ration72.

See 276 S.E.2d at 210. The court noted that "[tihe United States Supreme Court has expli-

citly recognized that a state is free to establish under its own constitution higher standards of protection than are afforded under the United States Constitution." Id.
73. Id. at 211. The West Virginia court reached a conclusion opposite from the United States
Supreme Court on this issue. See Hutto v. Davis, 102 S. Ct. 703, 705 & n.2 (1982); notes 44-58 and
accompanying text supra.
74. Although the Wanstreet court spoke approvingly of Hart v. Coiner it refused to follow the
Hartcourt's methodology and developed its own test for disproportionality. See part IIA2 infra.

75.

276S.E.2dat2il.

76. See State v. Pratt, 244 S.E.2d 227, 236 (W. Va. 1978); State v. McMannis. 242 S.E.2d 571.
575 (W. Va. 1978); Dye v. Skeen, 135 W. Va. 90, 62 S.E.2d 681,688 (1950).
77. See276S.E.2dat212-13.

78. Id.at 212.
79. Id. at 213. The court also noted that the defendant had already spent considerable time in
prison for the past offenses, treating this as a mitigating circumstance. See note 135 infra.
80. 276 S.E.2d at 213. Washington has since repealed its habitual criminal statute, leaving West
Virginia and Texas with the "'most draconian" statutes. See note 2 supra.
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ality of our criminal justice system where penalties are set according to
the severity of the offense.' '81 In its conclusion, the court suggested a
second basis for its holding when it stated that it could "conceive of [no]
rational argument that would justify the sentence." 8 2 This language implies that the court relied on a rational basis test as well.
III.

ANALYSIS

The opinion in Wanstreet raises three issues concerning the application
of the proportionality doctrine to recidivists. First, the court's conclusion
contains potential for confusion in its failure to distinguish between the
proportionality and rational basis tests. Second, the court, by modifying
past proportionality tests, brings to light issues about the method to be
used to measure the culpability of a recidivist's criminal act. Last, the
opinion stresses the recidivist statute's "failure to differentiate," indicating that the statute may be overly broad. An analysis of the overbreadth
doctrine shows the West Virginia recidivist statute to be unconstitutional.
A.

ProportionalityVersus the RationalBasis Test

The Wanstreet court had two justifications for its conclusion that the
sentence was unconstitutional: the sentence violated proportionality principles, and the sentence had no rational basis. 83 Close analysis shows that
the opinion rests solely on the disproportionality ground. The court relied
exclusively on proportionality principles throughout its analysis. Only
after finding the sentence disproportionate did the court consider rationality. This suggests that the West Virgnia court would find any disproportionate sentence "not rational. "84
81. 276S.E.2dat214.
82. Id. Possible rational bases are the legitimate purposes of punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, reformation, and retribution.
The presence of the proportionality clause in the West Virginia Constitution did not dictate a state
proportionality test as strict as the one that was adopted. The court could have followed the United
States Supreme Court's approach in Rummel, focusing on the fact of recidivism to the preclusion of
examining the underlying crime. It could also have followed the en banc court of appeals opinion in
Rummel which used an expansive version of the rational basis test to measure proportionality. See
Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), affd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); see
also McMahan v. State, 269 Ind. 566, 382 N.E.2d 154 (1978) (holding life sentence for three-time
forger did not violate state proportionality clause); People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d
338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (using a rational basis test to measure proportionality), cert. denied. 423
U.S. 950 (1975).
83. See text accompanying notes 81 & 82 supra.
84. See Wanstreet, 276 S.E.2d at 210-14. The court had, however, relied on a rational-basis
type test in earlier opinions. See. e.g., State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318, 330 (W.
Va. 1977).
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Nevertheless, the West Virginia court's framing of its conclusion is
potentially confusing. Although both the proportionality doctrine and the
rational basis test 85 are relevant in determining whether punishment is ex-

cessive, they are independent tests. Each has different standards for constitutionality, and each is based on different theories of punishment. The
United States Supreme Court distinguished the doctrines in Coker v.
Georgia,86 stating:
[Plunishment is excessive and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering: or
(2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. A punishment
87
might fail the test on either ground.
Because violation of either test may cause unconstitutionality, Wanstreet
is misleading for lower courts because it appears to require that both tests
be met before declaring excessive punishment unconstitutional. 88 While
85. The rational basis test encompasses a utilitarian theory that holds a sentence constitutional if
it is justifiable under any theory of punishment. See. e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-87
(1976) (using retribution and deterrence to justify and uphold death penalty); Rummel v. Estelle, 587
F.2d 651, 661 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). affd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Because long sentences may
rationally meet a state's interest in deterrence, incapacitation, and reformation, and yet be totally out
of proportion to the defendant's culpability, a sentence may be grossly disproportionate and still be
rational. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 246 n.9 (1972) (example of argument favoring the
death penalty for minor theft); Note. Disproportionalitvin Sentences. supra note 17, at 1122.
A further problem here is that courts will differ on what is rational. Compare Hart, 483 F.2d at
141, and Wanstreet, 276 S.E.2d at 214, with Rummel. 445 U.S. at 284-85. But see Rummel v.
Estelle. 587 F.2d 651, 659 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (had no right of parole existed the sentence
would have been disproportionate). affd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
86. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
87. Id. at592 (plurality
opinion). The first
partof the Coker test
has also been referred to as a
"necessity" test. See Note, Disproportionalivin Sentences, supra note 17. at 1124. Under this test.
"li]f there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the
punishment is inflicted. . . . the punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Hart v. Coiner. 483
F.2d 136. 141. 143 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); State exrel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318, 330 (W. Va. 1977). In most cases such a test is difficult to apply because it is
not easy to determine when punishment is so excessive that it serves no penal purpose without also
using either a rational basis or a proportionality test. See Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651. 661 (5th
Cir. 1978) (en bane), affd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980): cf. Rhodes v. Chapman. 101 S. Ct. 2392. 2398
(1981) (equating rational basis and necessity tests but suggesting necessity test may be broader).
88. Cf. Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405. 415 (2d Cir. 1978) (court confusing two parts of Coker
test), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979). The distinction between doctrines is also important because the adoption of proportionality potentially incorporates the retributive theory of punishment
into the Constitution.
This is important, in turn, because the retributive theory can act as an effective constitutional limit
on the extent to which a state may punish its citizens. Note, Disproportionalityin Sentences. supra
note 17, at 1122. The rational basis test-and the utilitarian theories it incorporates-cannot. First.
retribution effectively limits what a state may declare criminal by its requirement of defendant culpability. This, for example, bars any status from being classified as a crime. See Robinson v. Califor-
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the distinction may no longer be important under the Federal Constitution
after Rummel and Hutto, it is still important in states where stricter state
constitutional standards prevail.
B.

MeasuringMoral CulpabilityofRepeat Offenders

1.

The Wanstreet Test and OtherApproaches

The Wanstreet court developed a new method of measuring a recidivist's moral culpability to determine whether a punishment is disproportionate to the crime. Under this method, the court treats the sentence in
question as triggered primarily by the third felony and compares that sentence to punishment for other crimes in the same jurisdiction. 89 The Wanstreet court reasoned that "the third felony is entitled to more scrutiny
than the preceding felony convictions since it provides the ultimate nexus
to the sentence." 90
The court next examines the prior convictions to determine their effect
on the cumulative moral culpability. While the presence of prior convictions is given some weight, the focus of this inquiry is to determine if they
involved actual or threatened violence. 9 1 A court is also to consider mitigating circumstances such as time already served. 92 The moral culpability
of the current crime receives the heaviest emphasis; the past crimes are
nia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977); see
generally H. PACKER, supra note 17, at 77-79. Both punishment for a status'and preventive detention could be justified on utilitarian grounds. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 17, at 1076. Second,
retribution through proportionality limits the amount of punishment the state can impose for particular crimes more than a utilitarian system does. See note 85 supra.
Earlier decisions show that in the area of "penal" laws constitutional protection beyond that
granted by a rational basis test may be required. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 n.4 (1977)
(plurality) ("Because the death sentence is a disproportionate punishment for rape,-it is cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment even though it may measurably
serve the legitimate ends of punishment and therefore is not invalid for its failure to do so."); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 101 (1958); In re Rodriguez, 14
Cal. 3d 639, 653, 537 P.2d 384, 394, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 562 (1975).
Scholars support the view that the retributive theory should act as a limit on the power of the state
to punish. See N. MORRIS, supra note 24, at 75-78; H. PACKER, supra note 17, at 62-70; A. VON
HIRSCH, supra note 19, at 45-55, 70; Dressier, supranote 17, at 1075-81; Harris, Disquisition on
the Need for a New Modelfor CriminalSanctioningSystems, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 263, 324 (1975);
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment:An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24
STAN. L. REv. 838, 852-55 (1972).
89. 276 S.E.2d at 212-13.
90. Id. at212.
91. Id. at 214. The court claimed the purpose behind the West Virginia recidivist statute was to
increase confinement of dangerous offenders "who repeatedly [commit] serious crimes." Id. at 211.
See generally notes 75 & 76 and accompanying text supra(discussing the court's characterization of
the statute's purpose).
92. 276 S.E.2d at 213; see note 135 infra.
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viewed as aggravating the culpability for the current crime rather than
providing independent culpability.
This test differs from those of other courts. One approach is typified by
the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Hart v. Coiner.93 Under this method, the
court examines each of the recidivist's crimes individually with no special
weight given to the current offense. Courts using this test usually give
some emphasis to the status of recidivist. 94 The moral culpability of the
crimes in question is then compared to the moral culpability of major
crimes such as kidnapping or murder. Thus, courts add together the culpability of the recidivist's crimes in making the comparison-for exam95
ple, they compare three forgeries to one murder.
This approach has several problems. Recidivist statutes do not punish
for the past crimes but only for the current crime. 96 This means that the
presence of previous convictions can only be used to aggravate the recidivist's culpability for the latest offense. The Hart methodology, however,
treats the moral culpability from the past crimes as still existing and punishes for it. It also requires that the court compare the culpability of one
offense to that of three. This task is difficult and is avoided by increased
97
focus on the third felony.
A second approach to measuring a recidivist's culpability, adopted in
Rummel, focuses on the fact of recidivism rather than on the underlying
crimes. It treats recidivism as a status and justifies punishment on incapa98
citation and deterrence principles, not on moral culpability principles.
Underlying this method are assumptions that recidivism creates culpability per se and that it is not proper for courts to compare the culpability of
recidivism and individual crimes. 99 This method necessarily does not
93. 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). The Washington Supreme
Court followed this approach in State v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980).
94. For example, the Washington Supreme Court stated in State v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387. 402.
617 P.2d 720, 728 (1980): "[W]e must and do defer to the legislative decision to impose an enhanced
penalty on recidivists.'" The Hart court failed to mention whether the fact of recidivism, in itself.
allowed for additional punishment.
95. E.g., Hart, 483 F.2d at 142.
96. A second punishment for the past crimes would constitute double jeopardy for the defendants. See Gryger v. Burke. 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948). See generally note 102 infra (discussing why
recidivist statutes do not create double jeopardy).
97. The Rummel Court noted the difficulty of this comparison. 445 U.S. at 282 n.27: accord
Note, Disproportionaliv in Sentences, supra note 17, at 1165.
98. SeeRunmel. 445 U.S. at 284:
Having twice imprisoned him for felonies, Texas was entitled to place upon Rummel the onus of
one who is simply unable to bring his conduct within the social norms prescribed by the criminal
laws of the State.
The purposels] of a recidivist statute . . . are to deter repeat offenders and, at some point in
the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses . . . to segregate that person from
the rest of society for an extended period of time.
99. Seeid. at 282 n.27.
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measure moral culpability because moral culpability can attach only to
acts and not to a status. Although punishment based solely on a person's
status is unconstitutional, 10 0 this method justifies sentence length on the
basis of status.
A third approach, endorsed by several legal theorists' 0 1 and rejected by
the Wanstreet court,' 02 limits the moral culpability of a recidivist to that
attaching to the latest conviction. It rejects any special punishment based
on recidivism. Advocates of this approach note that the defendant presumably has already paid his or her debt to society for the prior convic03
tions and has thus expunged his or her moral culpability. 1
Nevertheless, this theory presumes that the main culpability that a state
should consider in setting punishment is the culpability attaching to the
actual or potential harmfulness of the act. This fails to sufficiently consider the culpability of the actor in committing the crime. 104 Most people
would presume that a repeat offender is more blameworthy and should be
punished not only for the culpability of the act but also for willfully continuing to disobey the laws of society despite past reproof.105 Further100. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
101. Dressier, supranote 17, at 1106-09; Von Hirsch, Desertand PreviousConvictions in SenL. REV. 591, 613 (1981).
tencing, 65 MINN,'.
102. Wanstreet, 276 S.E.2d at 212 & n. 12. Moreover, this theory has been implicitly rejected by
courts other than the Wanstreet court because it is inconsistent with cases holding that recidivist
statutes do not create double jeopardy. No double jeopardy occurs because the defendant is not being
punished for the earlier crimes. "The sentence as a . . . habitual criminal is not to be viewed as
either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes. It is a stiffened penalty for the latest
crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one." Gryger v. Burke,
334 U.S. 728,732 (1948); see Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631 (1912).
103. See Dressier, supra note 17, at 1108. Washington, which formerly had a harsh habitual
criminal law, is adopting such an approach. It is changing from an indeterminate sentencing system,
based on rehabilitation principles, to a determinate sentencing system, based on retribution principles. Under the new system, the maximum term for the current offense is the maximum punishment a
defendant can receive; recidivism cannot be used to enhance sentences. Absence of a previous offense is treated as a potential mitigating circumstance that will lessen the sentence. See Sentencing
Reform Act of 1981, ch. 137, § 12(5), 1981 Wash. Laws 519, 526 (effective 1984).
104. An actor's culpability comes from his or her mental state as well as from the harm done. See
note 19 and accompanying text supra. While traditional concepts of mental state, or mens rea, are
properly considered by these theorists, recidivism should be considered an aggravating circumstance,
contrary to the arguments of these theorists.
105. E.g., A. VON HnRscH, supranote 19, at 85. This commentator states: "[The criminal's] first
conviction . . . should call dramatically and personally to his attention that [criminal] behavior is
condemned. A repetition of the offense following that conviction may be regarded as more culpable,
since he persisted in the behavior after having been forcefully censured for it through his prior punishment."
See also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 571 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (stating that recidivism aggravates culpability of crimes).
Von Hirsch later rejected this view. He now argues that being a first-time offender makes the
defendant less blameworthy and is a punishment-mitigating circumstance. While the culpability for
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more, courts should avoid infringing on legislative decisions where possible; and a legislative determination of what creates moral culpability
deserves considerable deference. 106
The Wanstreet court's test for moral culpability measures a recidivist's
moral culpability more accurately than the other proposed tests. First, it
places primary emphasis on the latest crime in determining the culpability
and thus avoids the pitfall of comparing one crime to three. It treats prior
crimes as aggravating culpability for the latest crime rather than contributing directly to culpability. Also, it avoids justifying the punishment on
the basis of recidivist status. This creates a retribution-based proportionality test separate and independent from the utilitarian-based rational
basis test.
Although the Wanstreet test improves on the other approaches, it contains problems. For example, the amount of culpability the prior offenses
add to the latest offense is unclear. Nor can retribution principles alone
justify the West Virginia court's belief that a prior conviction for a "dangerous" crime creates enormous culpability for the subsequent crime
while a prior nondangerous crime creates little. 107 This result must rest on
the utilitarian ground of locking up dangerous criminals. 108 These problems spring from the Wanstreet court's failure to analyze the basis of a
recidivist's per se moral culpability. Therefore, like previous courts, it
was unable to compare the culpability deriving from the act of recidivism
to that of other crimes.
2.

Measuring Repeat Offenders' Culpability:A Suggested Approach

For a court to determine accurately whether the punishment fits the
crime, it must first determine which qualities of the crime create moral
culpability. It must also, as far as possible, rely on objective factors to
measure that culpability. The three-part test proposed below improves the
Wanstreet test in an effort to measure a repeat offender's culpability accurately. The parts of this proposed test, which is based on the traditional
proportionality test, are: the nature of the crime, the punishment for other
crimes in the same jurisdiction, and the punishment for the same crime in
other jurisdictions.
the current crime acts as a limit to the amount a state may punish, a state may punish less if it
chooses. Von Hirsch, supra note 101, at 613-15.
106. See, e.g., People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 110, 332 N.E.2d 338, 341. 371 N.Y.S.2d
471. 475. cert. denied. 423 U.S. 950 (1975).
107. Compare Wanstreet. 276 S.E.2d at 214, with State v. Beck, 286 S.E.2d 234, 244 (W. Va.
1981). and State v. Vance, 262 S.E.2d 423. 432 (W. Va. 1980) (once a violent crime is present, the
court refuses even to apply the Hart test to see if disproportionality is present).
108. See276S.E.2dat2ll.
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In the first part of the test, the nature of the crime, courts should examine how a recidivist's acts create culpability. The moral culpability that
accrues when a recidivist commits a crime comes from the one act, but
that act has two components: the culpability of the current crime, and the
recidivism. 09 The culpability of the act can usually be determined by
reference to the state's criminal code. Primary emphasis is given to the
actual or potential violence of the latest crime, with the degree of personal
injury or property loss acting as an additional consideration."10
The "recidivism" component aggravates the personal culpability of
the defendant in committing the crime.ll' With a repeat offender, additional culpability accrues because he or she has willfully disregarded society's values. 112 Although a state need not punish for recidivism, when it
does, the punishment must be related to the culpability and the usual punishment for the latest crime. 113 Recidivism must be treated as an aggra109. See notes 19, 106, 107 and accompanying text supra.
110. Degree of harm has commonly been used by courts and commentators as one measure of
moral culpability. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion) (stating that
rape carries less culpability than murder); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 363 (1910) (noting
that Weem's transgression of the statute was minor); In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1,8,553 P.2d 590, 595,
132 Cal. Rptr. 430, 435 (1976); H. PACKER, supra note 17, at 266-67. Furthermore, violent crimes
have consistently been considered as carrying far greater culpability than nonviolent crimes. See,
e.g., Grant, 18 Cal. 3d at 8,553 P.2d at 595, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 435; Griffin v. Warden, W. Va. State
Penitentiary, 517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.) (Hartnot followed where crimes violent), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 990 (1975); note 107 supra. These distinctions are also reflected in criminal codes. Compare
note 107 and accompanying text supra with notes 111-19 and accompanying text infra (violent nature of past crimes is important to but not determinative of issue of aggravation of culpability caused
by those crimes).
But see Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-76, 282 n.27. Justice Rehnquist refused to admit that any principled distinction could be made on the basis of amount of harm or presence of violence. Some of the
statements made in support of this thesis are questionable. For example, he compared Julius Caesar's
death by stabbing at the hands of Brutus-a violent crime-to the death of Hamlet's father, poisoned
by Claudius-a "nonviolent" crime. Id. at 282 n.27. Murder by any means is heinous. Justice
Rehnquist's analysis confuses one meaning of violent, the use of brute force, with the common meaning of "violent" in the criminal law context, crime directed against a person.
111. Only past convictions are constitutionally permitted to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the current crime. A state cannot give additional punishment based on a factor or
an act for which it could not criminally punish in the first place. Otherwise additional sentences, not
independently available, could be based on acts for which there had been no finding of guilt. This is
impermissible. See generally von Hirsch, supra note 101, at 607-13 (arguing that prior convictions
are the only personal history relevant to setting sentences).
112. See notes 104 & 105 and accompanying text supra.
113. The Model Sentencing and Corrections Act adopts this approach. Under the Act, which
adopts a "just-deserts" theory of punishment, recidivists cannot receive more than double the punishment for the underlying crime. See MODEL SErENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT §§ 3-104 & 105
(1979). This preserves the nexus between crime and punishment. See id. § 3-105 comment. Furthermore, under the Act, "[tihe prediction of the potential for future criminality by a particular defendant, unless based on prior criminal conduct or acts designated as a crime under the law, should not
be considered in determining. . . the length of [the sentence] to be imposed." Id. § 3-102(6).
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vating, not an independent, source of culpability. 114 The Wanstreet
court's approach, giving primary emphasis to the current crime, is
proper.

For the following reasons, one consequence of treating recidivism as a
culpability-aggravating circumstance is that the amount of punishment resulting from the recidivism cannot overshadow the amount resulting from
the crime. First, the amount of harm caused is one measure of moral culpability. The harm to society attributable to the crime itself, that is, the
actual forgery or robbery, is direct, while the harm from the willful disobedience is speculative. Second, the current offense is the ultimate
nexus between crime and punishment; 15 to disconnect the recidivism
from the crime may cause the court to cross over the thin line and punish
for status. 116 Third, passage of time and the past punishment received
militate against weighing the past crimes more heavily than the current
crime. 117 Last, the state must ultimately punish acts and not solely states
of mind. 18 Because punishing disobedience separately is punishing for
state of mind, a state cannot focus on the disobedience to the point of
eclipsing the crime constituting the act of disobedience. i19
In looking at the second part, the punishment for other crimes in the
same jurisdiction, the court first compares the total punishment for the
latest crime-including the enhancement for recidivism-to that nor114. That recidivism is only an aggravating circumstance follows from propositions established
earlier in this Note. First, culpability from past crimes cannot be punished without creating double
jeopardy. See notes 95 & 102 supra. Second, to punish for a propensity to commit crime is. in
violation of proportionality principles, to punish for status. See notes 21 & 100 and accompanying
text supra. Third. a recidivist's culpability in fact arises from his or her willful disobedience of society's values. See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
115. The Supreme Court adopted this line of reasoning in Coker. The Court refused to consider
the defendant's prior convictions for rape, murder, and kidnapping as aggravating circumstances
sufficient to justify capital punishment for rape. It concluded that the "instant crime" of rape was to
be used as the ultimate measure of moral culpability in determining whether the sentence was deserved. 433 U.S. at 598-99.
116. "[When a] sentence . . .no longer bears any reasonable relationship to the event which
triggered its possibility . . . It]he major thrust of the proceeding has shifted from the offense to the
status of the offender." In re Lynch. 8 Cal. 3d 410. 435, 503 P.2d 921,938. 105 Cal. Rptr. 217. 234
(1972) (quoting A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE. STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING AtTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 139 (1967)).
117. See. e.g.. In re Grant. 18 Cal. 3d 1. 17. 553 P.2d 590. 601. 132 Cal. Rptr. 430. 441
(1976).
118. "[T]he law of attempts requires a high order of proof that the actor really was engaged in
conduct that would have ledto an offense .... ." H. PACKER, supra note 17. at 100-01: see Callforma v. Robinson, 370 U.S. 660 (1962): H. PACKER, supra note 17. at 96-102: Dressier. supra note
17. at 1106.
119. The seriousness and the number of past crimes may increase the willfulness of the disobedience. However, no "bright tine" can be drawn between violent and nonviolent felonies: the relationship between the nature of the past crime and the willfulness involved in the current one is too attenuated to allow this. See von Hirsch. supra note 101. at 615- 16.
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mally allowable for the latest crime. If the total punishment greatly exceeds what the punishment would be for a first offense, and if the total
punishment is also equivalent to punishment for more serious crimes,
disproportionality is indicated.120 The court then compares the enhancement resulting from the recidivism to that allowable under other recidivist
statutes in the state. 121 In applying the third part, the sentences allowed
for the same crime in other jurisdictions, the court examines the punish22
ment that would be received elsewhere for the same kind of recidivism. 1
The second and third parts of the test, although modified, remain similar to those in the traditional proportionality test. The modifications are
designed to avoid comparing the culpability and punishment for recidivism to that of nonrecidivist crimes because of the difficulty of this comparison. The modifications also implement the policy, detailed above,
that recidivism should be treated as an aggravating and not an independent source of culpability.
C.

Overbreadth:The Requirement to Differentiate

Disproportionality in a sentence or statute may result not only from
excessiveness but from overbreadth as well. A statute on which a sentence is based is overly broad if it fails to differentiate between crimes of
vastly differing moral culpability. The Wanstreet court discussed only the
issue of excessiveness. It did note, however, that the statute's problems
were "not in the underlying criminal penalties but in [its] undifferentiated
23
nature."1
To date, courts have not adopted the overbreadth doctrine as a separate
constitutional requirement. Nevertheless, the doctrine is compelled by a
120. See Wanstreet, 276 S.E.2d at 212; notes 114-119 and accompanying text supra.
121. In In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972), the California
court compared punishment received under different recidivist statutes within the state. Id. at
434-35, 503 P.2d at 937, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 233-34.
122. See id. at 436-37,503 P.2d at 938-39, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
123. 276 S.E.2d at 213. In an overbreadth challenge, the statute inself is being challenged and
must be struck down if the challenge is successful. See note 138 infra.
Other recent challenges to recidivist sentences, where the statutes have not been overturned, involved attacks for excessive sentencing and not overbreadth. In these cases, defendants attacked only
the individual sentence involved rather than the statute itself. See, e.g., Rummel, 445 U.S. at 268;
Hart, 483 F.2d at 139; State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387, 390-91, 617 P.2d 720, 722 (1980); Wanstreet,
276 S.E.2d at 207, 214. Courts have been split on whether to allow attacks on sentences without
attacks on the statute as well. Several courts have refused to allow such challenges. United States v.
Washington, 578 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir. 1978); Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288, 1291 (6th Cir.),
vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 993 (1975); United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194, 200 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969). Contra Hart, 483 F.2d at 139 ("[A] concededly
valid statute may be applied in a particularcase in such a way as to violate various constitutional
provisions."); Fain, 94 Wn. 2d at 390, 402, 617 P.2d at 722, 728.
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system of proportionality. Statutory overbreadth violates proportionality
not because it leads to excessive punishment but because it violates a fundamental principle of our criminal justice system: the punishment must fit
the crime. Furthermore, several courts, including the Wanstreet court,
implicitly recognize the doctrine when they refer to a statute's "failure to
differentiate."
While courts have never adopted the overbreadth doctrine, they have
upheld the principles necessary for such an adoption. First, courts have
adopted the relative proportionality principle. The overbreadth doctrine
derives from relative proportionality; it requires that relative proportionality exist not only between statutes but within a given statute as well.
Courts have applied relative proportionality in "lesser-included offense"
cases. They have held sentences for a lesser-included offense of a crime
unconstitutional when the offense carried a longer sentence than the crime
itself. 124
Those cases in which courts have required differentiated punishments
for different crimes show support for the relative proportionality doctrine
as well. For example, courts reviewing sentences under statutes allowing
a broad range of punishment for conduct of widely-differing culpability
have held that maximum sentences authorized under the statute may not
be applied to some conduct outlawed by the statute. 125 In Thacker v. Garrison, 126 the defendant was convicted under a safecracking statute that
allowed sentences from ten years to life. Because the defendant's acts
showed only a "minor" violation of the statute, the court held his fiftyyear sentence disproportionate. Courts have also held statutes requiring
high minimum sentences unconstitutional for their failure to differentiate.

124. E.g.. Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976). cert. denied. 430 U.S. 973 (1977):
Willoughby v. Phend, 301 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ind. 1969): Dembowski v. State. 251 Ind. 250, 240
N.E.2d 815 (1968); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 281 P.2d 233 (1953). Courts generally have
been unwilling to hold unconstitutional equal sentences for crimes of seemingly different moral culpability, however. See Brown v. State, 261 Ind. 169, 301 N.E.2d 189 (1973) (holding second-degree
murder need not be punished less than first-degree murder); Note, DisproportionalitY in Sentences.
supra note 17, at 1139 n. 102; see also Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976). cert. denied.
430 U.S. 973 (1977): Willoughby v. Phend. 301 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ind. 1969). When a certain
punishment is sufficient for the greater offense, any additional punishment for the lesser is clearly
excessive.
125. See Thacker v. Garrison, 445 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.N.C. 1978): In re Rodriguez. 14 Cal. 3d
639. 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975): People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001. 121
Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975); see also State v. Evans. 73 Idaho 50. 245 P.2d 788. 793 (1952) (dictum stating
statutory sentences could be held excessive); State v. Houston. 273 S.E.2d 375 (W. Va. 1980) (setting forth procedures for such a sentence challenge). Cf. Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir.
1976) (limiting sentence under common law open-ended sentencing scheme for assault). cert. denied. 430 U.S. 973 (1977).
126. 445 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
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Thus, in In re Grant,127 the California Supreme Court held unconstitutional statutes that set a five-year minimum term before repeat drug offenders could be paroled.
By invalidating excessively long sentences for the less culpable conduct proscribed by a statute, courts "have implied that every defendant
has a constitutional right to a sentence proportionate to his particular violation of the statute, even if the sentence is less than the maximum authorized for the offense."' 128 Thus, gradation of punishment beyond that established by a statute may be required. These cases establish another
proposition as well: equal punishment for a broad range of crimes may
violate proportionality.
The second prerequisite to establishing an independent overbreadth
doctrine is to hold that the requirement to differentiate does not depend on
the presence of excessive punishment. The"lesser-included offense"
cases show that excessiveness, in fact, need not be required. In those
cases, the sole basis for overturning the sentences was the relative disproportionality of the sentence for the lesser-included offense to the sentence
for the "including" crime. The sentences for the lesser-included offenses
were not excessive standing alone; absent the relative proportionality requirement, they would have been upheld.
In re Grant supports not requiring excessiveness to find dispropotionality; in fact, the case appears to have been decided primarily on overbreadth grounds. In Grant, the challenged statutes required only five-year
minimum sentences for repeat drug offenders, scarcely excessive sentences on their face. Although the Grant court noted that the five-year
minimum punishment was excessive for certain of the acts prohibited, the
court's primary complaint was that the statutes were overly broad because
they failed to differentiate among defendants' moral culpability. 12 9 The
127. 18 Cal. 3d 1,553 P.2d 590, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1976).
128. Note, Disproportionalityin Sentences, supranote 17, at 1158.
129. 18 Cal. 3d at 10, 12-13, 17, 553 P.2d at 596, 598, 601, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 436, 438, 441.
The court stated:
The current provisions which are disapproved herein constitute cruel and unusual punishment
because they fail to discriminate between those offenders on the one hand whose prior offenses
were recent, serious or similar to the new offense and whose criminal motivations pose serious
threats to society, and those offenders on the other hand who pose a lesser threat to society
because their prior. . . convictions were remote in time, relatively trivial in scope or unrelated
to the new conviction. . . . The penalties currently provided are cruel and unusual as to the
latter group of offenders and, because they cannot be severed to eliminate application to such
group, must be struck down in their entirety.
Id. at 17, 553 P.2d at 601, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 441; see also id. at 8 n.6, 553 P.2d at 595 n.6, 132 Cal.
Rptr. at 434 n.6 ("[o]ur disapproval of the instant provisions is based on their overbreadth... ");
In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 647, 537 P.2d 384, 390, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 558 (1975). But see
Grant, 18 Cal. 3d at 13, 553 P.2d at 598, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 438 ("the standard is whether the manda-
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court specifically noted that the statute encompassed conduct of widely
differing culpabilities without consideration of particular defendants' circumstances. 130
The Supreme Court's opinion in Weers-the opinion that originally
adopted proportionality as a constitutional principle-also supports
adopting overbreadth as an independent constitutional principle. The
Court observed that "the law in controversy seem[ed] to be independent
of degrees," noting that the law only allowed sentences between twelve
and twenty years for acts with great differences in culpability. 13 1 It stated:
"It must be confessed that [the law in question] excite[s] wonder in minds
accustomed to a more considerate adaption of punishment to the degree of
132
crime."
West Virginia's recidivist statute is similarly overbroad and should be
held unconstitutional because of its failure to differentiate punishments
for crimes of vastly differing moral culpability. 133 The statute provides
neither gradation nor court discretion in sentence length for a remarkably
broad range of offenses. The statute requires the same sentence for a person convicted of second-degree murder, with past convictions for rape
and first-degree assault, as for someone convicted for forgery with two
past convictions for other minor crimes. The statute also fails to consider
any individual circumstances that may mitigate or aggravate culpability
within offenses. 134 This further increases the wide range of culpability
which must be treated identically within the terms of the statute.
The unconstitutionality of a nondifferentiated statute that requires defendants committing crimes of vastly different moral culpabilities to retory prison term is excessive as applied to those offenders whose criminal conduct is within the less
severe ranges of culpability comprehended by the offense").
130. 18 Cal. 3d at 8-12. 553 P.2d at 595-97, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 435-37. In Grant. unlike cases
in which proportionate sentences are possible under the statute, the statutes themselves were overturned. See also Carmona v. Ward, 436 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (likewise overturning statute). rev'd on other grounds. 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978). cert. denied. 439 U.S. 1091 (1979): In re
Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921. 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972). See generally note 138 ihfra (discussing when statutes should be overturned).
131.
217 U.S. at 365.
132. 1d.

133. Any challenge must be under the West Virginia Constitution. Rummel and Huito preclude
any challenge to the statute on federal constitutional grounds. See notes 44-58 and accompanying
text supra.

134. The moral culpability of both the crime and the criminal are important in determining moral
culpability. See note 19 supra. Courts often consider a statute's failure to allow for individual mitigating circumstances when determining that statute's or sentence's proportionality. See. e.g.. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (individual circumstances must
be viewed before death penalty is given); Grant. 18 Cal. 3d at 8-12, 553 P.2d at 595-97. 132 Cal.
Rptr. at 435-37: People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827, 831 (1972). But see Lockett
v. Ohio. 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality opinion) (dictum) (individual circumstances need
not be viewed in noncapital cases).
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ceive the same sentence is supported by West Virginia Supreme Court
decisions. First, the court has relied heavily on retribution principles on
which the proportionality doctrine rests. 135 Second, the court has said that
situations may arise when proportionality will require gradation of punishment beyond that required by the terms of a statute. In State v. Houston, 136 the court found that some sentences under the West Virginia robbery-by-violence statute, 137 which allowed sentences from ten years to
life, could be disproportionate. 138
Last, Wanstreet supports a holding that the statute is unconstitutionally
overbroad. Implicit in the court's ruling is the conclusion that elemental
unfairness results from treating those convicted of three minor crimes
identical to those convicted of three major crimes. This is because while a
life sentence may be appropriate for a criminal guilty of a lifetime of violent crime, it is unfair for someone like Wanstreet. Furthermore, Wan.street shows that the West Virginia statute's overbreadth leads to exces-

135. The proportionality analysis used by the Wanstreet court shows a reliance on retribution
principles. The court's finding that Wanstreet's past long prison sentences were mitigating factors is
an example. 276 S.E.2d at 213. Although not expressed by the court, there are two reasons why
retribution principles should lead to this result. First, punishment atones for past crimes-the
prisoner pays his or her debt to society-and therefore reduces any remaining moral culpability.
Second, the overall retributive effect of the punishment depends on the total punishment received for
past and present crimes; the long punishment for the past crimes increases the cumulative punishment
the prisoner receives. The court also displayed "retribution" reasoning when it noted that a major
problem with the recidivist statute is its undifferentiated nature. 276 S.E.2d at 213. See also note 59
supra (discussing West Virginia's adoption of retribution reasoning in other cases).
136. 273 S.E.2d 375 (W. Va. 1980).
137. W. VA. CODE§ 61-2-12(1977).
138. 273 S.E.2d at 376-77. The court stated: "With the exception of the life recidivist statute
, we do not believe that the disproportionality principle can have any significant application
other than to [the robbery-by-violence] type of sentencing statute. Id. at 391. But see State ex rel.
Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977) (proportionality principle used to overturn incarcerations for non-criminal juveniles).
The Houston court found the robbery-by-violence statute constitutional even though the statute had
the potential for excessive sentences. The holding was based on the open-ended nature of the statute's
sentencing provisions. Open-ended sentencing statutes traditionally have been upheld, despite their
breadth, because they have the flexibility to allow a judge to give constitutional sentences. See Wanstreet, 276 S.E.2d at 212; Thacker v. Garrison, 445 F. Supp. 376, 380 (W.D.N.C. 1978); In re
Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 647-48, 537 P.2d 384, 390-91, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 558-59 (1975);
State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788 (1952). Unlike an open-ended statute, West Virginia's
recidivist statute fails to allow for any flexibility in sentencing.
As an alternative to holding the statute unconstitutional, the court can draw a line between the
constitutional and unconstitutional portions of the statute. See Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 553 P.2d 590,
132 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1976). The best "bright line" in West Virginia's recidivist statute would be
between violent and nonviolent crimes. The West Virginia court has already relied heavily on this
distinction. Nevertheless, the court should be wary of involving itself in limiting the statute because
this involves line drawing, which is the legislature's province.
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sive sentences, and that the court therefore need not rely solely on
"overbreadth" to overturn the statute. 139
IV.

CONCLUSION

Wanstreet and other recent state opinions show both a divergence between state and federal courts on the use of proportionality and dissatisfaction in some states with Rummel. They also show that, so long as principles of federalism prevent the federal courts from reviewing state
sentencing, the burden rests on the state courts to ensure that punishments
fit crimes. Recent cases indicate that it is likely that a number of state
courts will do so. 140 The result will be a system of judicial federalism-at
least in eighth amendment analysis-with widely disparate standards existing at the federal and state levels.
With the repeal of Washington's habitual criminal statute, 141 West Virginia's recidivist statute becomes one of the two broadest and harshest in
the country. Only West Virginia and Texas now demand life imprisonment for three nonviolent felonies. The steady trend has been away from
these sweeping statutes with draconian punishments.
The West Virginia court should, based on its state constitution, reconsider the constitutionality of its recidivist statute. Wanstreet established
moral culpability and proportionality as constitutional standards. The
court should take the next step and apply proportionality to hold its recidivist statute unconstitutionally broad for its failure to differentiate among
crimes of widely varying culpability.
Marc G. Wilhelm

139. Another serious constitutional difficulty with West Virginia's recidivist statute is that it de
facto punishes lesser offenses more than greater ones. This occurs because the statute enhances the
sentences received by petty criminals far more than it enhances sentences of dangerous criminals.
who already receive substantial sentences. A major complaint with broad statutes of the type West
Virginia has is that they have their harshest effect on the less dangerous criminal. See Katkin. Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration,21 BUFFALO L. REV. 99. 106-08 (197 1).
140. See State v. Fain, 94 Wn. 2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980) Wanstreet, 276 S.E.2d 205 (W.Va.
1981). Because the California court has based many of its decisions on its state constitution, the
California standard also is likely to differ from the federal. See, e.g., Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1. 553 P.2d
590, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1976); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073. 112 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1974). See also People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972) (calling for strong
proportionality test based on state constitution).
141. See note 2 supra.

